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In this paper, we examine the pricing strategies in a two-stage supply chain with two competitive
manufacturers and one retailer. We address six game models: the centralized model (Model I), the MS-
Bertrand model (Model II), the MS-Stackelberg model (Model III), the RS-Bertrand model (Model IV), the
RS-Stackelberg model (Model V) and the cost-sharing contract model (Model VI) to explore the optimal
pricing strategies of substitutable products. We address the optimal green manufacturing level, retail
prices, wholesale prices and the proﬁts of supply chain members as well as the whole supply chain under
different models. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the efﬁciency and effectiveness of the
proposed models. First the impact of green investment on the green manufacturing level and supply
chain performance is examined. Then the impact of price elasticity, cross-price sensitivity and green
manufacturing coefﬁcient on the green manufacturing level is analyzed. We ﬁnd that the centralized
model is the best, and the cost-sharing contract model will be better than the four decentralized models
when the cost-sharing proposition is in a certain interval. Additionally, in decentralized scenarios, the
Stackelberg model has an advantage for manufacturers while the Bertrand model is superior for the
retailer. Our results also indicate that green manufacturing will beneﬁt the manufacturer involved in
green investment.
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
With the development of society and the economy and the
increased standard of living, green manufacturing gradually gains
awareness. Consumers and companies are more conscious of
environmental issues and the risks posed by unmitigated climate
change (Fahimnia et al., 2015; Laari et al., 2016). Today, increasing
numbers of consumers buy no-pollution and environmentally
harmless green products, while many manufacturers and retailers
produce or sell green products to enhance their competitive
advantage (Li et al., 2015; Ülkü and Hsuan, 2017). Consumers prefer
to pay more for low-carbon, energy saving and eco-protective
products, driving green industry development. Moreover, national
manufacturing strategies such as “German industrial 4.0” and
“Made in China 2025” also contribute to the development of green
manufacturing. In this study, we are interested in analyzing theg).impact of green investment on green manufacturing level and
supply chain performance, as well as the impact of price elasticity,
cross-price sensitivity and green manufacturing coefﬁcient on the
green manufacturing level. We aim to examine how the supply
chain members maximize their proﬁts in a competitive
environment.
The negative effects of climate change caused by industrial ac-
tivities are inevitable. Therefore, countries and businesses around
the world hope to ﬁnd more eco-friendly industrial management
systems or develop efﬁcient supply chain management (Sulistio
and Rini, 2015; Kumara et al., 2015). In addition, given the inﬂu-
ence of complicated markets and multifaceted challenges, recent
studies show that sustainable supply chain management (SSCM)
has become ever more important and thus has received increased
attention from academics and practitioners (Bechtsis et al., 2017;
Ansari and Kant, 2017). To an extent, SSCM is an extension of
green supply chain management (GSCM). The goal of a green
supply chain is to improve supply and distribution efﬁciencies, save
time and money and satisfy customer needs (Bhattacharya et al.,
2015). GSCM efﬁciently improves brand image, then captures an
P. Ma et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 183 (2018) 618e640 619increased market share and gains customer trust by providing
desired and quality products (Sharma et al., 2017). Therefore, GSCM
can contribute to sustainable performance enhancement, leading
to SSCM performance and green innovation (Chin et al., 2015). To
improve green performance, GSCM is crucial and must be
addressed (Jabbour et al., 2015; Geng et al., 2017).
In the practices of manufacturing corporations, GSCM is closely
related tomany activities, including green design, green operations,
green innovation, green manufacturing, etc. (Seman et al., 2012).
However, manufacturing will not develop without government
ﬁnancial intervention (Hafezalkotob, 2015, 2017). Moreover, GSCM
is inﬂuenced by internal and external factors, while industry,
people, and government are regarded as three vital sectors for
GSCM (Ma et al., 2014; Kuei et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015; Zhang et al.,
2016).
Many enterprises choose GSCM to be a vital part of their stra-
tegic plan. Additionally, multiple international enterprises stipulate
that their suppliers produce greener products. Therefore, their
suppliers must reduce resource consumption and improve pro-
duction efﬁciency during themanufacturing process. Consequently,
a green management strategy can not only create a new market
opportunity but also improve corporate reputation awareness,
which increases the competitiveness of the enterprise. Although
supply chain members differ in bargaining power, they are all in
pursuit of maximum proﬁts and minimum risk of potential losses
(Laari et al., 2017). Many authors have investigated the GSCM from
different perspectives (e.g., Ma et al., 2014; Kuei et al., 2015; Li et al.,
2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Laari et al., 2017). However, it remains
unclear how supply chain members make pricing strategies in a
competitive, green-manufacturing context, and how the green in-
vestment of one manufacturer affects the supply chain
performance.
To address the above problems, we study a two-stage supply
chain composed of two competitive manufacturers and one
retailer. We discuss the optimal results under six models: the
centralized model (Model I), the decentralized model involving
MS-Bertrand model (Model II), MS-Stackelberg model (III), RS-
Bertrand model (IV) and RS-Stackelberg model (Model IV), as
well as the cost-sharing contract model (Model VI) based on the
MS-Bertrand model. We also analyze the effects of green invest-
ment on the green manufacturing level and on the supply chain
performance. In addition, we analyze the impacts of the price
elasticity, the cross-price sensitivity, and the consumer sensitivity
on the green manufacturing level.
Our contributions are as follows. First, our paper focuses on the
pricing decisions of the green supply chain in different scenarios.
The results will enhance and expand the GSCM research. Second,
we consider the competition between two manufacturers and
introduce the manufacturer's green strategy into the model. Most
previous studies concentrate on a green supply chain consisting of
onemanufacturer and one or two retailers. Different from them, we
address a horizontal competition of Manufacturer 1 (M1) and
Manufacturer 2 (M2) in the supply chain and explore how the green
investment affects the supply chain performance. The difference
between the two manufacturers is that M1 is the green manufac-
turer and M2 is the traditional manufacturer. We also assume that
the two products are substitutable. Finally, under the cost-sharing
contract model, we assume that M1 adopts green manufacturing
during the entire manufacturing process and the retailer accepts
the terms offered in the contract. Moreover, we focus on the in-
ﬂuence of the green investment parameter, price elasticity, cross-
price sensitivity and the green manufacturing coefﬁcient on the
green manufacturing level and the supply chain performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review
related literature in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe thenotations and assumptions of the model. Sections 4 and 5 analyze
the centralized and decentralized models respectively. The cost-
sharing contract model is analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 pre-
sents the numerical comparison. Finally, we provide conclusions in
Section 8.
2. Related literature
Our study encompasses three research streams: optimal pricing
strategies of substitutable products in supply chains, optimal
pricing strategies under the green supply chains, and cost-sharing
and revenue-sharing contracts in supply chains.
2.1. Optimal pricing strategies of substitutable products in supply
chains
Customers may not always be able to ﬁnd a preferred product,
which results in unmet demand that is often substituted with an
alternative (Shin et al., 2015). Therefore, pricing strategies of sub-
stitutable products have become a popular research area in the
supply chain management. Hsieh and Wu (2009) ﬁnd that supply
chain proﬁts in all models increase with a higher degree of product
substitutability. Gürler and Yılmaz (2010) address a single-period,
newsboy-type inventory problem with two substitutable prod-
ucts. Bish and Suwandechochai (2010) study the degree of substi-
tution between products and the level of operational
postponement for the optimal capacity and the resulting expected
proﬁt. Zhao et al. (2012) study the pricing problem of substitutable
products with one manufacturer and two competitive retailers in a
fuzzy environment. Zhao et al. (2014) analyze the pricing decisions
of two competitivemanufacturers and one common retailer for two
substitutable products. Zhang et al. (2015) consider a one-
manufacturer, one-retailer supply chain and investigate two types
of substitutable products: environmental and traditional. S¸en
(2016) studies a duopoly model consisting of two ﬁrms selling
their ﬁxed stocks of two substitutable items over a selling season.
Different from them, we focus on pricing strategies and studying
the effects of green investment on supply chain performance.
2.2. Optimal pricing strategies under green supply chains
A reasonable pricing strategy is critical for green products to
acquire market share. Tang and Yin (2007) address a base model
with deterministic demand to examine how a retailer determines
both the order quantity and the retail prices of two substitutable
products under ﬁxed and variable pricing strategies. Chen and Sheu
(2009) demonstrate that the appropriate design of environmental-
regulation pricing strategies promotes extended product re-
sponsibility for ﬁrms in a competitive market. Karakul and Chan
(2010) study the joint pricing and procurement of two, one-way
substitutable products. Jia and Zhang (2013) investigate the dy-
namic pricing and ordering decisions for a durable product with
multiple generations in the context of one manufacturer and one
retailer. Chen et al. (2013) study the pricing policies in a supply
chain with one manufacturer selling a product to an independent
retailer and directly to consumers through an Internet channel.
Ceryan et al. (2013) consider a ﬁrm producing substitutable prod-
ucts via a capacity portfolio consisting of both product-dedicated
and ﬂexible resources and characterize the structure of the
optimal production and pricing decisions. Li et al. (2016) introduce
e-commerce into GSCM and discuss the pricing and green strate-
gies in both centralized and decentralized models. Bajwa et al.
(2016) address a multi-product pricing and production problem
in a discrete-time setting with capacity constraints and setup costs.
Under the Big Data environment, Liu and Yi (2017) propose four
Table 1
Notations.
Given parameters
a The initial market potential
ε The degree of customer loyalty to the product 1
ci Unit manufacturing cost of product 1 (i¼ 1) and product 2 (i¼ 2)
Di The market demand of product 1 (i¼ 1) and product 2 (i¼ 2)
a The price elasticity of demand to its own price
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advertising and products green degree. By contrast, our research
focuses on the pricing strategies of substitutable products in a
supply chain where only one manufacturer invests in green
manufacturing.
2.3. Cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts in supply chains
The formulation and implementation of an effective coordina-
tion strategy among member companies is key to the promotion of
sustainable development of a green supply chain (Cao and Zhang,
2013). Tsao and Sheen (2012) show that an appropriate range for
the fraction of promotion cost sharing can achieve channel coordi-
nation and ensure the distribution of increasable proﬁt. Analo-
gously, cost and revenue sharing can be a measure of channel
coordination (Kunter, 2012; Ma et al., 2013). Ghosh and Shah (2015)
explore supply chain coordination problems arising from green
initiatives and explore the impact of a cost-sharing contract on the
decisions of supply chain members undertaking green initiatives.
With cost-sharing and wholesale price premium contracts, the
retailer can achieve the goal of reducing carbon emissions jointly
with the manufacturer, which can encourage the manufacturer to
increase its carbon emission reduction rate and enhance the proﬁts
of the supply chain (Wang et al., 2016). Lastly, Dai et al. (2017) ﬁnd
that a cost-sharing contract brings more proﬁts to supply chain
members and thewhole supply chain than a non-cooperativemodel
does.We study how themanufacturer encourages the retailer to sell
green products through sharing of costs in green investment.
3. Model description
We consider a two-stage supply chain with two manufacturers
and one retailer. Eachmanufacturer sells one product to the retailer
and the two products are substitutable to each other. Specially, M1
is a green manufacturer and produces product 1 with green design,
sustainable material and smart technology in the manufacturing
process. In contrast, M2 is a traditional manufacturer and produces
product 2 by using conventional design, high energy consumption
and traditional technology. Generally, product 1 use less carbon and
thus is much cleaner, greener and more environmentally friendly
than product 2.
To promote industrial transformation, the manufacturers (i.e.,
M1 and M2) produce their respective products at different unit
production costs ci ði ¼ 1;2Þ and sell them at different unit
wholesale prices ui ði ¼ 1;2Þ to the same retailer. The retailer sells
the two products at a respective unit retail price pi ði ¼ 1;2Þ. Our
model setting is shown in Fig. 1.
We assume that market demand D1 for M1's products is a linear
function of two retail prices and the green manufacturing level ðqÞ,
while market demand D2 for M2's products is a linear function ofFig. 1. Supply chain model structure.the retail prices p1 and p2. The demand functions are given as
follows:
D1 ¼ εa ap1 þ gp2 þ bq; (1)
D2 ¼ ð1 εÞa ap2 þ gp1: (2)
where a represents the initial market potential and ε is the degree
of customer loyalty to product 1, and 1 ε is the degree of customer
loyalty to the product 2; 0  ε  1. The parameters a and gmeasure
the price elasticity of demand to its own price and the cross-price
sensitivity, respectively. Assume the parameters a and g satisfy
a> g> 0, which means that the demand for a product is more
sensitive to changes in its ownprice than changes in the price of the
competing product. Parameter b measures consumer sensitivity to
the green manufacturing level (i.e., green manufacturing coefﬁ-
cient). Market demand can be satisﬁed in the selling period.
In the demand function, ε is a constant. M1 and M2 divide the
market and product demands are affected by the two prices. Notice
that Eq. (1) reﬂects a “green” sensitive consumer market and it is
increasingly linear with the green manufacturing level. We capture
the impact of retail prices and the green manufacturing level on
market demand in a tractable deterministic linear form. Assume
that green manufacturing does not inﬂuence the marginal cost of
M1's production. We investigate the effects of greenmanufacturing
level on the demand for product 1. Additionally, we aim to deter-
mine how the green manufacturing level affects the proﬁts of the
manufacturers and the retailer. To model the cost of green
manufacturing, we consider an increasing and convex cost struc-
ture that reﬂects how the green manufacturing level results in the
initial changes in products and processes. The cost of green
manufacturing is given by Iq2, where I is the green investment
parameter (Ghosh and Shah, 2015). Lastly, in our base model, the
green investment is decided by M1.
The basic notations are shown in Table 1 and proofs of Propo-
sitions are given in the Appendix.4. The centralized model (model I)
In this section, we consider that only one decision maker de-
termines the retail prices and the green manufacturing level in the
supply chain.g The cross-price sensitivity
b The green manufacturing coefﬁcient
f The fraction of the green manufacturing cost that M1 pays
I The green investment parameter
П Proﬁt function
Decision variables
ui The wholesale price of product 1 (i¼ 1) and product 2 (i¼ 2)
pi The retail price of product 1 (i¼ 1) and product 2 (i¼ 2)
q The green manufacturing level
Superscripts/Subscripts
()* Optimal results
()I, ()II, ()III Results from the centralized model, the MS-Bertrand model, and the
MS-Stackelberg model, respectively
()IV, ()V,
()VI
Results from the RS-Bertrand model, the RS-Stackelberg model, and
the cost-sharing contract model, respectively
()Mi, ()R,
()SC
Results from manufacturer i (i¼ 1, 2), retailer and supply chain,
respectively
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PSC ¼ ðp1  c1ÞD1 þ ðp2  c2ÞD2  Iq2
¼ ðp1  c1Þðεa ap1 þ gp2 þ bqÞ þ ðp2  c2Þ½ð1 εÞa ap2
þ gp1  Iq2
(3)
The following proposition summarizes the optimal solutions in
a centralized model.
Proposition 1. In the centralized model, the optimal retail price of
product 1 ðpI*1 Þ, the optimal retail price of product 2 ðpI*2 Þ, the optimal
green manufacturing level ðqI*Þ, and the optimal proﬁt of supply chain
ðPI*SCÞ are respectively:
pI*1 ¼
2IA2  c1ab2
4IA1  ab2
; (4)
pI*2 ¼
4IA3  A4b2
2

4IA1  ab2
 ; (5)
qI* ¼ A5b
4IA1  ab2
; (6)
PI*SC ¼
4IA6  ðA7bÞ2
4

4IA1  ab2
 : (7)
A1 eA7 are deﬁned in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, we study the impact of the green manufacturing coefﬁ-
cient (b) on the green manufacturing level q.
Proposition 2. The greenmanufacturing level q increases with b, i.e.,
vq
I*
vb
 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that the green manufacturing level q in-
creases with the green manufacturing coefﬁcient b. This is because
that when b becomes lager, its effect on the market demand will
increase, then the manufacturer is likely to enhance the green
manufacturing level.
In the following sections, we consider the decentralized model
and then discuss the cost-sharing contract. Lastly, we compare the
above-mentioned six models and examine the effects of model
parameters.5. The decentralized model
5.1. Decision models in MS game
We assume that the MS decentralized decision consists of two
larger manufacturers and one relatively smaller retailer, and the
manufacturers control the market. The two manufacturers and the
retailer take a sequential non-cooperative game where two man-
ufacturers are leaders and the retailer is a follower.
The objective functions of M1, M2 and the retailer are as follows:
PM1 ¼ ðu1  c1Þðεa ap1 þ gp2 þ bqÞ  Iq2; (8)PM2 ¼ ðu2  c2Þ½ð1 εÞa ap2 þ gp1; (9)
PR¼ðp1u1ÞD1þðp2u2ÞD2
¼ðp1u1Þðεaap1þgp2þbqÞþðp2u2Þ½ð1εÞaap2þgp1:
(10)5.1.1. The MS-Bertrand model (model II)
Assume that M1 and M2 are the Stackelberg leaders and the
retailer is the follower. The retailer independently determines the
retail prices. Based on the retailer's decisions, M1 determines its
wholesale price and the green manufacturing level and M2 sets its
wholesale price simultaneously. The deﬁnition of the MS-Bertrand
model is given as:
8<
:
max
u1;q
PM1

u1; p
*
1ðu1;u2; qÞ; p*2ðu1;u2; qÞ; q

max
u2
PM2

u2; p
*
1ðu1;u2; qÞ; p*2ðu1;u2; qÞ

p*1ðu1;u2; qÞ;p*2ðu1;u2; qÞ
max
ðp1;p2Þ
PRðp1; p2Þ
The following proposition summarizes the optimal solutions in
the MS-Bertrand model.
Proposition 3. The optimal values of the wholesale prices uII*1 and
uII*2 , the green manufacturing level q
II*, the retail prices pII*1 and p
II*
2 ,
and proﬁts of M1, M2, the retailer and the supply chain are as follows:
uII*1 ¼
2IB2  c1ab2
IB1  ab2
; (11)
uII*2 ¼
4IB3  A4b2
2

IB1  ab2
 ; (12)
qII* ¼ B4b
2

IB1  ab2
 ; (13)
pII*1 ¼
4IB5  B6b2
4A1

IB1  ab2
 ; (14)
pII*2 ¼
4IB7  B8b2
4A1

IB1  ab2
 ; (15)
PII*M1 ¼
I

8Ia b2

B24
4

IB1  ab2
2 ; (16)
PII*M2 ¼
a

4IB9  A7b2
2
8

IB1  ab2
2 ; (17)
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h
4IB4

4IB10A7gb2

þ

4IB9A7b2

4IB11A7ab2
i
a2
16A1

IB1ab2
2 ;
(18)PII*SC ¼
h
4IB4

4IB10  A7gb2

þ

4IB9  A7b2

4IB11  A7ab2
i
a2 þ A1

4I

8Ia b2

B24 þ 2a

4IB9  A7b2
2
16A1

IB1  ab2
2 : (19)where B1-B11 are deﬁned in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now study the impact of the green manufacturing coefﬁ-
cient (b) on the greenmanufacturing level and obtain Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The green manufacturing level increases with b, i.e.,
vq
II*
vb
 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that the green manufacturing level q al-
ways increases with the green manufacturing coefﬁcient b. Here,
we have the same managerial insights as Proposition 2.5.1.2. The MS-Stackelberg model (model III)
When two manufacturers make sequence decisions, we as-
sume that M1 acts as the leader and M2 acts as a follower. M1
adopts green manufacturing and ﬁrst announces the wholesale
price of product 1 and the green manufacturing level. Then, M2
determines the wholesale price of product 2 in order to
maximize its proﬁt. Finally, based on the decisions made by M1
and M2, the retailer determines the retail prices of the two
products. We can formulate the MS-Stackelberg model as
follows:
max
u1;q
PM1

u1; p
*
1

u1;u
*
2ðu1; qÞ; q

; p*2

u1;u
*
2ðu1; qÞ; q

; q

u*2ðu1; qÞ8>><
>>:
max
u2
PM2

u2; p
*
1ðu1;u2; qÞ;p*2ðu1;u2; qÞ

p*1ðu1;u2; qÞ;p*2ðu1;u2; qÞ
max
p1;p2
PRðp1;p2Þ
The following proposition summarizes the optimal solutions in
the MS-Stackelberg model.
Proposition 5. The optimal values of the wholesale prices uIII*1 and
uIII*2 , the green manufacturing level q
III*, the retail prices pIII*1 and p
III*
2 ,
and proﬁts of M1, M2, the retailer and the supply chain are as follows:
uIII*1 ¼
2IB13  c1ab2
IB12  ab2
; (20)
uIII*2 ¼
2IB14  A4ab2
2a

IB12  ab2
 ; (21)qIII* ¼ B4b
2

IB12  ab2
 ; (22)pIII*1 ¼
4IB15  B6b2
4A1

IB12  ab2
 ; (23)
pIII*2 ¼
2IB16  B17b2
2aA1

IB12  ab2
 ; (24)
PIII*M1 ¼
IB24
4a

IB12  ab2
 ; (25)
PIII*M2 ¼

2IB18  A7ab2
2
8a

IB12  ab2
2 ; (26)
PIII*R ¼
4B19I2 þ 4B20ab2I þ A27a4b4
16aA1

IB12  ab2
2 ; (27)
PIII*SC ¼ PIII*M1 þP
III*
M2 þP
III*
R : (28)
where B12-B20 are deﬁned in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now study the impact of the green manufacturing coefﬁ-
cient (b) on the greenmanufacturing level and obtain Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The greenmanufacturing level q increases with b, i.e.,
vq
III*
vb
 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.5.2. Decision models in RS game
We assume that RS decentralized decisions appear in a market
controlled by a powerful retailer. Assume the retailer is the leader
and the two manufacturers are followers in this scenario. We also
use the sequential non-cooperative game to solve the above
problem.
5.2.1. The RS-Bertrand model (model IV)
In this model, the retailer ﬁrst determines the retail prices of
two substitutable products. Having perceived the retail prices, the
twomanufacturersmake their decisions simultaneously. That is M1
determines the wholesale price of product 1 and the green
manufacturing level, and M2 determines the wholesale price of
product 2. We express the RS-Bertrand model as:
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ðp1;p2Þ
PR

p1; p2;u
*
1ðp1; p2Þ;u*2ðp1; p2Þ; q*ðp1; p2Þ

u*1ðp1; p2Þ;u*2ðp1; p2Þ; q*ðp1; p2Þ8<
:
max
u1;q
PM1ðu1; qÞ
max
u2
PM2ðu2Þ
The following proposition summarizes the optimal solutions in
the RS-Bertrand model.
Proposition 7. The optimal values of the wholesale prices uIV*1 and
uIV*2 , the green manufacturing level q
IV*, the retail prices pIV*1 and p
IV*
2 ,
and proﬁts of M1, M2, the retailer and the supply chain are as follows:
uIV*1 ¼
8C7I2 þ 2C8b2I  c1g2b4
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (29)
uIV*2 ¼
8C9I2 þ 2C10b2I  c2g2b4
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (30)
qIV* ¼

4C11I þ C12gb2

b
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (31)
pIV*1 ¼
8C13I2 þ 2C14b2I þ C15
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (32)
pIV*2 ¼
8C16I2 þ 2C17b2I  c2g2b4
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (33)
PIV*M1 ¼
I

4C11I þ C12gb2
2
4aI  b2

h
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
i2 ; (34)
PIV*M2 ¼
4aI2

4C18I þ C19b2
2
h
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
i2 ; (35)
PIV*R ¼
2aIð2C20Iþ C21b2Þ
16ðC1I2þC2b2IÞ  g2b4
; (36)
PIV*SC ¼ PIV*M1 þP
IV*
M2 þP
IV*
R : (37)
where C1, C2, C7-C21 are deﬁned in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 8. The greenmanufacturing level q increases with b, i.e.,
vq
IV*
vb
 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.5.2.2. The RS-Stackelberg model (model V)
In this case, the retailer ﬁrst announces the retail price. ThenM1
determines the wholesale price and the green manufacturing level
of product 1 to maximize his proﬁt. Finally, M2 sets the wholesale
price of product 2. The RS-Stackelberg model can be formulated asfollows:
max
ðp1;p2Þ
PR

p1; p2;u
*
1ðp1;p2Þ;u*2ðp1; p2Þ; q*ðp1; p2Þ

u*1ðp1;p2Þ;u*2ðp1; p2Þ; q*ðp1; p2Þ8>><
>>:
max
u1;q
PM1ðu1; q; p1;p2Þ
u*2ðp1; p2Þ
max
u2
PM2ðu2; p1; p2Þ
The following proposition summarizes the optimal solutions in
the RS-Stackelberg model.
Proposition 9. The optimal values of the wholesale prices uV*1
and uV*2 , the green manufacturing level q
V*, the retail prices pV*1 and
pV*2 , and proﬁts of M1, M2, the retailer and the supply chain are as
follows:
uV*1 ¼
4C27I2 þ 2C28ab2I  c1a2g2b4
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
; (38)
uV*2 ¼
2C29I2 þ C30b2I  c2g2a3b4
8a

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 g2a3b4
; (39)
qV* ¼

2C31I þ C8ga2b2

b
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
; (40)
pV*1 ¼
4C32I2 þ C33ab2I þ C15a2
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
; (41)
pV*2 ¼
2C34I2 þ C35ab2I  c2g2a3b4
8a

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 g2a3b4
; (42)
PV*M1 ¼
I

2C31I þ C12ga2b2

4C36I2 þ 2C37ab2I  C12ga3b4

a
h
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
i2 ;
(43)
PV*M2 ¼
I2

2C38I þ C39ab2
2
a
h
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
i2 ; (44)
PV*R ¼
I

C40I þ C41a2b2

8a

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 g2a3b4
; (45)
PV*SC ¼ PV*M1 þP
V*
M2 þP
V*
R ; (46)
where C22, C23, C27-C41 are deﬁned in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 10. The green manufacturing level q will increase with
b, i.e., vq
V*
vb
 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
P. Ma et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 183 (2018) 618e640624We now examine the cost-sharing contract model and address
whether the cost-sharing contract can improve supply chain per-
formance. Specially, we introduce the cost-sharing contract into the
MS-Bertrand model.6. The cost-sharing contract model (model VI)
In this section, we assume that M1 and the retailer share the
cost of green manufacturing. If the retailer actively shares the cost
incurred by green manufacturing, it promotes the development of
the green manufacturing process. Therefore, we assume that M1
offers to share f proportion of the total cost of greenmanufacturing
and the retailer accepts the offer, incurring 1 f proportion of the
green manufacturing cost ð0<f  1Þ (Ma et al., 2013; Ghosh and
Shah, 2015). Based on the above description, the objective func-
tions of M1 and the retailer are as follows:
PM1 ¼ ðu1  c1Þðεa ap1 þ gp2 þ bqÞ  fIq2; (47)PVI*R ¼
4fIa2B4

4fIB10  A7gb2

 4ð1 fÞIA1B24b2 þ a2

4fIB9  A7b2

4fIB11  A7ab2

16A1

fIB1  ab2
2 ; (56)
PVI*SC ¼
4fI

8fIab2

A1B24þ2a

4fIB9A7b2
2
A14ð1fÞIA1B24b2þ4a2fI

4fIB10A7gb2

B4þa2

4fIB9A7b2

4fIB11A7ab2

16A1

fIB1ab2
2 :
(57)PR ¼ ðp1  u1Þðεa ap1 þ gp2 þ bqÞ þ ðp2  u2Þ½ð1 εÞa ap2
þ gp1  ð1 fÞIq2:
(48)
Proposition 11. The optimal values of the wholesale prices d and
uIII*2 , the green manufacturing level q
III*, the retail prices pIII*1 and p
III*
2 ,
and the proﬁts of M1, M2, the retailer and the supply chain are as
follows:
uVI*1 ¼
2fIB2  c1ab2
fIB1  ab2
; (49)
uVI*2 ¼
4fIB3  A4b2
2

fIB1  ab2
 ; (50)qVI* ¼ B4b
2

fIB1  ab2
 ; (51)
pVI*1 ¼
4fIB5  B6b2
4A1

fIB1  ab2
 ; (52)
pVI*2 ¼
4fIB7  B8b2
4A1

fIB1  ab2
 ; (53)
PVI*M1 ¼
fI

8fIa b2

B24
4

fIB1  ab2
2 ; (54)
PVI*M2 ¼
a

4fIB9  A7b2
2
8

fIB1  ab2
2 ; (55)where A1, A4, A7, B1-B11 are deﬁned in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now study the impact of the green manufacturing coefﬁ-
cient (b) on the green manufacturing level and obtain Proposition
12.
Proposition 12. The green manufacturing level q increases with b,
i.e.,vq
VI*
vb
 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 12 shows that the green manufacturing level q in-
creases with the green manufacturing coefﬁcient b. Here, we have
the same managerial insights as Propositions 2 and 4. In the next
section, we conduct numerical experiments to obtain more insights
from above, and study the effects of the green investment param-
eter I on the green manufacturing level and supply chain perfor-
mance, and then study the impacts of parameters a, g and b on the
greenmanufacturing level. Lastly, we investigate the effects of cost-
sharing proportion ðfÞ on the supply chain performance.
P. Ma et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 183 (2018) 618e640 6257. Numerical analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst study the impact of green investment on
the greenmanufacturing level and supply chain performance. Then,
we study the effects of parameter a, g and b on the green
manufacturing level.7.1. Comparison and analysis of the optimal values numerically
For the ease of analysis, we provide a numerical example to
compare the optimal values of the wholesale prices, the green
manufacturing level, the retail prices and themaximumproﬁts. The
default values of the model parameters are given as follows:
a¼ 800, ε¼ 0.6, c1¼16, c2¼15, a¼ 6, g¼ 4, b¼ 3, f¼ 0.6. We let
I¼ 3, and then the corresponding results are shown as in Tables 2
and 3.
In Table 2, we can ﬁnd that both the retail prices and wholesale
prices of two products obtain the highest in the cost-sharing con-
tract model, followed by the MS-Stackelberg model and obtain the
lowest in the RS-Bertrand model. It is obvious that the retail prices
in the Stackelberg model are higher than those in the Bertrand
model. We also derive an interesting result: the green product (i.e.,
product 1) achieves higher retail prices inMS game than those in RS
Game. As we know, during the early periods of green product sales,
the retailer usually uses the relatively lower prices to attract cus-
tomers and expand the market. On the other hand, there is a small
difference between MS game and RS game for product 2's retail
prices. In addition, the green manufacturing level obtains the
highest in the centralized model and obtains the lowest in the MS-
Bertrand model. Moreover, the green manufacturing levels are
higher in RS game than those in MS game.
In Table 3, we ﬁnd that the proﬁts of the entire supply chain
achieve the highest in the centralized model and reach the lowest
in the MS-Stackelberg model. Moreover, the RS game can make the
supply chain obtainmore proﬁts than theMS game can. The retailer
achieves the highest proﬁts in the RS-Bertrand model, followed by
the RS-Stackelberg model and obtains the lowest proﬁts in the MS-
Stackelberg model.
Based on the above results, we can gain some interesting in-
sights. The centralized model can make the green manufacturing
level and the supply chain proﬁts achieve the highest, while the
retail prices and thewholesale prices obtain the highest in the cost-Table 2
Optimal values of the wholesale prices, the green manufacturing level and the retail
prices under different models.
Decision scenario p*1 u
*
1 q
 p*2 u
*
2
Centralized model 139.871 e 61.935 122.081 e
MS-Bertrand model 145.476 70.665 13.664 128.958 57.718
MS-Stackelberg model 150.677 79.146 15.786 131.010 60.549
RS-Bertrand model 141.174 48.109 16.054 127.883 34.566
RS-Stackelberg model 146.444 54.464 19.232 130.116 35.846
Cost-sharing contract model 151.571 73.558 23.982 132.538 58.686
Table 3
Optimal proﬁts of supply chain, M1, M2, and the retailer under different models.
Decision scenario P*SC P
*
M1 P
*
M2 P
*
R
Centralized model 43240.210 e e e
MS-Bertrand model 35274.007 8401.555 5474.607 21397.915
MS-Stackelberg model 34947.892 8556.233 6224.009 20167.650
RS-Bertrand model 36593.957 5412.560 2297.066 28884.331
RS-Stackelberg model 36703.330 5794.612 2607.433 28301.285
Cost-sharing contract model 37088.093 8903.334 5725.358 22459.401sharing contract model. Moreover, when the retailer is the Stack-
elberg leader in the RS game, the retailer obtains more proﬁts
under the Bertrand model than under the Stackelberg model.
7.2. The impact of green investment on the green manufacturing
level and supply chain performance
Wenow further study the effects of green investment parameter
on the optimal green manufacturing level and supply chain per-
formance under different models. For the numerical study, we as-
sume that a¼ 800, ε¼ 0.6, c1¼16, c2¼15, a¼ 6, g¼ 4, b¼ 3,
f¼ 0.6 and the value of I varies from 2 to 10.
7.2.1. The impact of green investment on the green manufacturing
level
Fig. 2 illustrates the effect of the green investment parameter (I)
on the green manufacturing level in the six models as indicated in
the ﬁgure. It shows that the optimal green manufacturing level
decreases with the green investment parameter, and the green
manufacturing levels under the six models tend to be closer when
the green investment parameter is relatively large. Moreover, the
green manufacturing level obtains the highest in the centralized
model and reached the lowest in theMS-Bertrandmodel. Fig. 2 also
shows that the greenmanufacturing level in RS game is better than
in MS game, and the green manufacturing level in the Stackelberg
model is better than the Bertrand model.
For enterprises, costs and risks are two issues they need to face.
There is not necessarily a directly proportional relationship be-
tween inputs and outputs. As a rational being, each member of the
supply chain focuses on maximizing its own proﬁts. Thus, most of
them would rather adopt a wait-and-see attitude or invest less in
the early stage of green production. As a result, the centralized
model is more conducive to enhance green manufacturing level
than other ﬁve models.
7.2.2. The impact of green investment on supply chain performance
Figs. 3e6 demonstrate that the effect of the green investment
parameter (I) on the proﬁts of the supply chain, retailer, M1 andM2,
respectively. Fig. 3 shows that the supply chain proﬁts decrease
with the green investment parameter. Additionally, we also deriveFig. 2. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the green manufacturing level.
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 3. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the supply chain proﬁts. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to
the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 4. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the retailer's proﬁts. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to
the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 5. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the M1's proﬁts. (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the
Web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the M2's proﬁts. (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the
Web version of this article.)
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chain proﬁts are higher in the cost-sharing contract model than
those in the decentralized models. Second, the manufacturers gain
more proﬁts under the Stackelberg models than under the Bertrand
models. On the contrary, the retailer obtains more proﬁts under the
Bertrand models. Moreover, the proﬁts of M2 decrease with the
green investment parameter in MS models while increasing with
the green investment parameter in RS models. Later, both of the
decision scenarios tend to become stable. The explanations for
these phenomena can be given as follows.
Firstly, we ﬁnd that Figs. 3e5 ﬁrst have a declining trend and
then become steady. Second, it is favorable for M1 to share the
green manufacturing cost on account of transferring various risks
appropriately and then maintain an intimate relationship with the
retailer. Moreover, the cost-sharing contract model can improve
supply chain performance than other decentralized models. We
also ﬁnd that supply chain proﬁts under the centralized case are
higher than those in the cost-sharing contract and otherdecentralized models, while the cost-sharing contract model will
be better for theM1, the retailer as well as the supply chain than the
other decentralized models.7.2.3. Comparison between the proﬁts of M1 and M2
Recall that M1 and M2 manufacture products substitutable to
each other. The difference betweenM1 andM2 is that M1 invests in
green manufacturing. Therefore, product 1 is much greener and
more expensive than product 2. Assume that a¼ 800, ε¼ 0.6,
c1¼16, c2¼15, a¼ 6, g¼ 4, b¼ 3, and the value of I varies from 2 to
10. Figs. 7, 8 and 11 demonstrate that both the proﬁts of M1 and M2
decrease with green investment parameter (I). Figs. 9 and 10 show
that M1's proﬁts decrease with the green investment parameter (I)
while M2's proﬁts increase with the green investment parameter
(I).
As the green investment parameter (I) increases, we ﬁnd that
M1's proﬁts are higher than those of M2, which indicates that M1
can beneﬁt from green manufacturing. Although green
manufacturing will incur more costs to M1, the demand for its
green product will also increase. Usually, customers are willing to
Fig. 8. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the manufacturers' proﬁts (MS-
Stackelberg model). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 9. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the manufacturers' proﬁts (RS-
Bertrand model). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 10. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the manufacturers' proﬁts (RS-
Stackelberg model). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 7. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the manufacturers' proﬁts (MS-
Bertrand model). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
P. Ma et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 183 (2018) 618e640 627buy a new, different or novel product if its price is acceptable.
Because of its green nature, product 1 will attract many consumers
to buy and the demand will increase accordingly. Thus, in its initial
stage, green manufacturing provides M1 with great beneﬁt and a
competitive advantage over M2. Nonetheless, this does not mean
that the more investment M1 makes in green manufacturing, the
more proﬁt it will obtain. When the green manufacturing level has
achieved a steady state or the maximum, it is unnecessary to invest
more in green manufacturing. Suppose that M1 continues green
investment, it has to raise the wholesale price of product 1 to
ensure proﬁt. This will cause the retailer to raise the retail price of
product 1, leading to a decrease in demand of the product. This is
the reason why M1 is more competitive and proﬁtable than M2 at
the beginning of green manufacturing.7.3. The impact of parameter a, g and b on the green
manufacturing level
We now study the impact of parameters a, g and b on the green
manufacturing level. Using the same parameters as in Section 7.1:
a¼ 800, ε¼ 0.6, c1¼16, c2¼15 and let I¼ 2 in this section.7.3.1. The impact of parameter a on the green manufacturing level
To study the relationship between price elasticity (a) and the
green manufacturing level (q), we set g¼ 4, b¼ 3 and a2[6,10].
Fig. 12 shows that the green manufacturing level decreases with
price elasticity a. Specially, in the six models, the green
manufacturing level achieves the highest in the centralized model
and reaches the lowest in the MS-Bertrand model. Moreover, the
effect of price elasticity (a) on the green manufacturing level is not
obvious when parameter a is relatively large.7.3.2. The impact of parameter g on the green manufacturing level
To study the relationship between cross-price sensitivity (g) and
the green manufacturing level (q), we denote a¼ 6, b¼ 3 and g2
[0,4]. Fig. 13 shows that the green manufacturing level increases
with cross-price sensitivity (g). In the centralized model, the green
manufacturing level increases most rapidly with parameter g,
while the green manufacturing level increases with g most slowly
under the MS-Bertrand model.
Fig. 12. The effect of price elasticity (a) on the green manufacturing level. (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the
Web version of this article.)
Fig. 13. The effect of cross-price sensitivity (g) on the green manufacturing level. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to
the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 14. The effect of the green manufacturing coefﬁcient (b) on the green
manufacturing level. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 11. The effect of green investment parameter (I) on the manufacturers' proﬁts in
cost-sharing contract model (f¼ 0.6). (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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To study the relationship between the green manufacturing
coefﬁcient (b) and the green manufacturing level q, and we set
a¼ 6, g¼ 4 and b2[0,4]. Fig. 14 shows that the green
manufacturing level increases with parameter b. Particularly, the
green manufacturing level achieves the highest in the centralized
model and reaches the lowest in theMS-Bertrandmodel. Moreover,
the green manufacturing level increases with bmore quickly under
the centralized model than other models.7.4. The effect of cost-sharing proportion ðfÞ on the supply chain
performance
By setting a¼ 800, ε¼ 0.6, c1¼16, c2¼15, a¼ 6, g¼ 4, b¼ 3,
I¼ 2, we compare the proﬁts of the retailer, M1 andM2 respectively
in the MS-Bertrand and cost-sharing contract models when the
value of the cost-sharing proportion f varies from 0.2 to 1. Fig. 15Fig. 15. Comparison of the retailer's proﬁts between the MS-Bertrand model and the
cost-sharing contract model.
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contract model than those under the MS-Bertrand model when
parameter f is in a certain range. When the value of f is relatively
small, the retailer's proﬁts under the cost-sharing contract model
are less than those under the MS-Bertrand model. In this case, the
retailer would not accept M1's contract. However, when the value
of f is in the range of [0.3,0.4], the retailer's proﬁts increase with f
and are larger than those under theMS-Bertrandmodel. In this case
the retailer would accept the contract. Figs. 16 and 17 shows that
both the proﬁts of M1 and M2 under the cost-sharing contract
model are higher than those under the MS-Bertrand model. Be-
sides, the proﬁts of both M1 and M2 will always decrease with f,
which indicates that M1 wishes the retailer to share more of the
greenmanufacturing cost. From the above analysis, we can see that
the cost-sharing contract model will beneﬁt all the supply chain
members.
Recall that the two manufacturers are the leaders and the
retailer is the follower in the MS-Bertrand model. GreenFig. 16. Comparison of M1's proﬁts between the MS-Bertrand model and the cost-
sharing contract model.
Fig. 17. Comparison of M2's proﬁts between the MS-Bertrand model and the cost-
sharing contract model.manufacturing will incur variable costs and may generate new
potential risks. When the retailer shares M1's green manufacturing
cost, M1 will probably enhance the green manufacturing level,
which beneﬁts both the retailer and M1. However, when the cost-
sharing proportion f is relatively too small (i.e., the retailer bears
more of the green manufacturing cost), the retailer obtains less
proﬁts under the cost-sharing contract model than those under the
MS-Bertrand model. In this case, M1 should determine appropriate
contract parameters to motivate the retailer, or they can set con-
tract parameters through bargaining.8. Conclusions
In this study, we address the issue of pricing strategies for a
supply chain with two manufacturers and one retailer, in which
market demand is inﬂuenced by the prices of the two different
products and the green manufacturing level.
First, we investigate and optimize the centralized model. Then,
we consider the four decentralized models. In addition, based on
the MS-Bertrand model, we consider the cost-sharing contract
model. We ﬁnd that the centralized model (Model I) is superior to
the other models, followed by the cost-sharing model (Model VI),
while the MS-Bertrand model (Model II) has the lowest efﬁciency.
Moreover, the manufacturers can obtain more proﬁts under the
Stackelberg model than those under the Bertrand model, while the
retailer can achieve more proﬁts under the Bertrand model than
those under the Stackelberg model. To improve supply chain per-
formance, both the manufacturers and the retailer must have
mutual trust and share the green manufacturing cost.
Subsequently, we analyze the effects of the green investment
parameter on the green manufacturing level and supply chain
performance. We also compare the proﬁts of M1 and M2 under
Model II, Model III, Model IV, Model V and Model VI respectively,
and ﬁnd that M1's proﬁts are higher than M2's proﬁts. The results
indicate that green manufacturing is encouraging and worth of
popularizing. Thenwe study the impacts of parameter a, g and b on
the green manufacturing level. We ﬁnd that the centralized model
is the best, followed by the cost-sharing contract model, and the
MS-Bertrand model is the worst.
For future research, we can study the coordination problemwith
green manufacturing. Moreover, we can investigate the pricing
strategies under information asymmetry of the green investment
parameter of M1.Acknowledgments
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Proof of Proposition 1. In the centralized case, we solve the
objective function of the supply chain.
P. Ma et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 183 (2018) 618e640630The ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (3) with respect to p1, p2 and q
can be set to 0 as follows:
vPSC
vp1
¼ εaap1þgp2þbqðp1c1Þaþðp2c2Þg¼0; (A1)
vPSC
vp2
¼ð1 εÞaþgp1ap2þðp1c1Þgðp2c2Þa¼0; (A2)
vPSC
vq
¼ ðp1 c1Þb 2Iq ¼ 0: (A3)
We can also obtain the Hessian matrix of PSC as follows:
Hðp1;p2;qÞ¼
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
v2PSC
vp21
v2PSC
vp1p2
v2PSC
vp1q
v2PSC
vp2p1
v2PSC
vp22
v2PSC
vp2q
v2PSC
vqp1
v2PSC
vqp2
v2PSC
vq2
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
¼
0
@2a 2g b2g 2a 0
b 0 2I
1
A:
(A4)
Note that the Hessian matrix of PSC is a negative deﬁnite for p1,
p2 and q if I and b satisfy the conditions 4Iða2 g2Þ ab2>0.
Combining Eqs. (A1)-(A3), we can obtain:
pI*1 ¼
2IA2  c1ab2
4IA1  ab2
; (A5)
pI*2 ¼
4IA3  A4b2
2

4IA1  ab2
 ; (A6)
qI* ¼ A5b
4IA1  ab2
; (A7)
Substituting Eqs. (A5)-(A7) into Eq. (3), we can obtain the
optimal proﬁt of the supply chain:
PI*SC ¼
4IA6  ðA7bÞ2
4

4IA1  ab2
 : (A8)
where
A1 ¼ a2  g2;A2 ¼ ða gÞðaεþ c1aþ c1gÞ þ ag;
A3 ¼ ða gÞð  aεþ c2aþ c2gÞ þ aa;
A4 ¼ a aεþ c2aþ c1g;A5 ¼ ða gÞðaε c1a c1gÞ þ ag;
A6 ¼

a2  g2

 2ac1εþ 2ac2ε 2c1c2g 2ac2 þ ac21 þ ac22

2εða gÞð1 εÞa2 þ aa2;
A7 ¼ a aε c2aþ c1g:
Proof of Proposition 2. Taking the ﬁrst derivative of Eq. (6) with
respect to b, we obtainvqI*
vb
¼

c1g2  c1a2 þ aεa aεgþ ag

4Ia2  4Ig2 þ ab2


4Ia2  4Ig2  ab2
2 :
Recall that a>g> 0, 4Ia2 4Ig2 ab2 >0, and c1g2 c1a2þ
aεa aεgþ ag ¼ ða gÞðaε c1a c1gÞþ ag ¼ A5, then we have
vq
I*
vb
 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the decentralized case, we solve the
objective function of two manufacturers and the retailer respec-
tively. We ﬁrst solve the MS-Bertrand model.
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (10) with respect to p1 and
p2 and setting them equal to 0, we obtain that:
vPR
vp1
¼ aε ap1 þ gp2  ðp1  u1Þaþ ðp2  u2Þgþ bq ¼ 0;
(A9)
vPR
vp2
¼ ð1 εÞa ap2 þ gp1 þ ðp1  u1Þg ðp2  u2Þa ¼ 0;
(A10)
and the Hessian matrix of PR is as follows:
Hðp1; p2Þ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PR
vp21
v2PR
vp1p2
v2PR
vp2p1
v2PR
vp22
1
CCCCA ¼
2a 2g
2g 2a
	
: (A11)
Eq. (A11) shows that the Hessian matrix of PR is a negative
deﬁnite for all values of p1 and p2 if a>g. From Eqs. (A9) and (A10),
we can derive that:
p1 ¼
aaε agεþ u1a2  u1g2 þ abqþ ag
2

a2  g2 ; (A12)
p2 ¼
aaεþ agεþ u2a2  u2g2 þ gbqþ aa
2

a2  g2 : (A13)
Substituting Eqs. (A12) and (A13) into Eqs. (8) and (9), we can
obtain that:
PM1¼

gu1u2c1gu2aεc1þaεu1þac1u1au21bqc1þbqu1

2
Iq2;
(A14)
PM2 ¼
ðu2  c2Þða aεþ gu1  au2Þ
2
: (A15)
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (A14) with respect to u1
and q, and the ﬁrst order derivative of (A15) with respect to u2 and
setting them equal to 0, we can obtain that:
vPM1
vu1
¼ au1 þ
gu2
2
þ bq
2
þ aεþ ac1
2
¼ 0; (A16)
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vu2
¼ gu1
2
 au2 þ
a aεþ ac2
2
¼ 0; (A17)
vPM1
vq
¼ ðu1  c1Þb
2
 2Iq ¼ 0: (A18)
Accordingly, the Hessian matrix of PM1 is as follows:
Hðu1; qÞ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PM1
vu21
v2PM1
vu1q
v2PM1
vqu1
v2PM1
vq2
1
CCCCA ¼
0
BB@
a b
2
b
2
2I
1
CCA: (A19)
The Hessianmatrix ofPM1 is a negative deﬁnite for all u1 and q if
I, a and b satisfy the conditions that 2Ia b24 >0.
Then the second-order derivatives of PM2 are given below:
v2PM2
vu22
¼ a: (A20)
Because Eq. (A20) is negative, thus
vPM2
vu2
¼ 0 has the unique
solution.
Solving Eqs. (A16)-(A18), we ﬁnd that
uII*1 ¼
2IB2  c1ab2
IB1  ab2
; (A21)
uII*2 ¼
4IB3  A4b2
2

IB1  ab2
 ; (A22)PII*SC ¼ PII*M1 þP
II*
M2 þP
II*
R ¼
h
4IB4

4IB10  A7gb2

þ

4IB9  A7b2

4IB11  A7ab2
i
a2 þ A1

4I

8Ia b2

B24 þ 2a

4IB9  A7b2
2
16A1

IB1  ab2
2 :
(A29)B1 ¼ 8a2  2g2;B2 ¼ 2aaε agεþ 2c1a2 þ c2agþ ag;
B3 ¼ 2aaεþ agεþ 2c2a2 þ c1agþ 2aa;B4 ¼ aεð2a gÞ  c1

2a2
B5 ¼ agð1 εÞ

5a2  2g2

þ að2c1aþ c2gÞ

a2  g2

þ 3aaε

2a2 
B6 ¼ agða aε c2aÞ þ c1a

4a2  3g2

;
B7 ¼ agε

5a2  2g2

þ að2c2aþ c1gÞ

a2  g2

þ 3aað1 εÞ

2a2 
B8 ¼ ða aεþ c1gÞ

3a2  2g2

þ c2a

a2  2g2

;
B9 ¼ aεð2a gÞ  c2

2a2  g2

þ að2aþ c1gÞ;
B10 ¼ aεð2a gÞða gÞ 

a2  g2

ð2c1aþ c2gÞ þ 3aag;
B11 ¼ aεð2a gÞða gÞ 

a2  g2

ð2c2aþ c1gÞ þ a

2a2 þ g2

:qII* ¼ B4b
2

IB1  ab2
 : (A23)
Substituting Eqs. (A21)-(A23) into Eqs. (A12), (A13), (8)e(10), we
obtain that
pII*1 ¼
4IB5  B6b2
4A1

IB1  ab2
 ; (A24)
pII*2 ¼
4IB7  B8b2
4A1

IB1  ab2
 ; (A25)
PII*M1 ¼
I

8Ia b2

B24
4

IB1  ab2
2 ; (A26)
PII*M2 ¼
a

4IB9  A7b2
2
8

IB1  ab2
2 ; (A27)
PII*R ¼
h
4IB4

4IB10A7gb2

þ

4IB9A7b2

4IB11A7ab2
i
a2
16A1

IB1ab2
2 :
(A28)
Thus, the total proﬁt of the supply chain is as follows:where g2

þ gðaþ c2aÞ;
g2

;
g2

;
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respect to b, we get
vqII*
vb
¼

c1g22c1a2þ2aaεaεgþc2agþag

8Ia22Ig2þab2

2

8Ia22Ig2ab2
2 :
Recall that a>g, 2Ia b24 >0, 8Ia2 2Ig2þ ab
2 >0, and c1g2
2c1a2þ 2aaε aεgþ c2agþ ag ¼ aεð2a gÞ c1ð2a2 g2Þþ
gðaþ c2aÞ ¼ B4 >0. Thus, we have vq
II*
vb
 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. In the MS-Stackelberg model, two man-
ufacturers make sequence decisions. Similar to the MS-Bertrand
model, we ﬁrst derive the response functions of the retailer, i.e.,
Eqs. (A12) and (A13).
Then, we solve Eq. (A17) and get:
u2 ¼
gu1 þ a aεþ ac2
2a
: (A30)
Substituting Eqs. (A12), (A13) and (A30) into Eq. (8), we can
obtain that:
PM1 ¼ 
1
4a
h
2a2  g2

u21 þ 4Iaq2 þ 2c1abq aεgc1 þ 2aaεc1
þ agc1c2 þ agc1 þ

aεg 2aaε 2a2c1 þ g2c1  agc2
 ag 2abq

u1
i
:
(A31)
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (A31) with respect to u1
and q, and setting them equal to 0, we can obtain that:vPM1
vu1
¼
 4a2 þ 2g2u1 þ 2abqþ 2a2  g2c1 þ agc2 þ agð1 εÞ þ 2aaε
4a
¼ 0; (A32)vPM1
vq
¼ bu1
2
 2Iq bc1
2
¼ 0: (A33)
The Hessian matrix of PM1 is as follows:
Hðu1; qÞ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PM1
vu21
v2PM1
vu1q
v2PM1
vqu1
v2PM1
vq2
1
CCCCA ¼
0
BBB@
2a2 þ g2
2a
b
2
b
2
2I
1
CCCA:
(A34)The Hessianmatrix ofPM1 is a negative deﬁnite for all u1 and q if
I, a and b satisfy the conditions that 8Ia
24g2ab2
4a >0.
Solving Eqs. (A32) and (A33), we ﬁnd that
uIII*1 ¼
2IB13  c1ab2
IB12  ab2
; (A35)
qIII* ¼ B4b
2

IB12  ab2
 : (A36)
After substituting Eq. (A35) into Eq. (A30), we can ﬁnd that
uIII*2 ¼
2IB14  A4ab2
2a

IB12  ab2
 : (A37)
Substituting Eqs. (A35)-(A37) into Eqs. (A12), (A13), (8)e(10), we
attain that:
pIII*1 ¼
4IB15  B6b2
4A1

IB12  ab2
 ; (A38)
pIII*2 ¼
2IB16  B17b2
2aA1

IB12  ab2
 ; (A39)
PIII*M1 ¼
IB24
4a

IB12  ab2
 ; (A40)
PIII*M2 ¼

2IB18  A7ab2
2
8a

IB12  ab2
2 ; (A41)PIII*R ¼
4B19I2 þ 4B20ab2I þ A27a4b4
16aA1

IB12  ab2
2 : (A42)
Thus, the total proﬁt of the supply chain can be expressed as
follows:
PIII*SC ¼ PIII*M1 þP
III*
M2 þP
III*
R : (A43)
where
B12 ¼ 8a2  4g2;B13 ¼ aεð2a gÞ þ c1

2a2  g2

þ gðaþ ac2Þ;
B14 ¼

4a2  g2

ða aεþ ac2Þ þ c1g

2a2  g2

þ 2aagε;
B15 ¼ agð1 εÞ

5a2  3g2

þ
h
c1

2a2  g2

þ agc2
i
a2  g2

þ 2aaε

3a2  2g2

;
B16 ¼

a2  g2
h
ac2

4a2  g2

þ gc1

2a2  g2
i
þ 2aagε

5a2  3g2

þ að1 εÞ

12a4  9a2g2 þ g4

;
B17 ¼ aða aεþ gc1Þ

3a2  2g2

þ c2a2

a2  2g2

;
B18 ¼ gc1

2a2  g2

 ac2

4a2  3g2

þ að1 εÞ

4a2  g2

þ 2aagε;
B19 ¼ þ

a2  g2
h
c22a
2g4 þ a2ε2g2

16a2  3g2

 4ac2εga2

8a2  3g2

 2ac1c2g

2a2  g2
i
2ac1

a2  g2

2a2  g2
h
gð1 εÞ

8a2  3g2

þ 2εa

4a2  g2
i
þ 16aa6

2ε2  2εþ 1

þ4a2agεð1 εÞ

4a2  g2
2 þ a2g2

þ c21

a2  g2

4a2  3g2

2a2  g2
2  2ac2að1 εÞ

16a6 þ g6  20a4g2 þ 3a2g4

þ

a2  g2

2a2  g2
h
3a2g2ð1 2εÞ þ 4a2c22

a2  g2
i
;
B20 ¼ a2ð1 εÞ2

4a4 þ a2g2  g4

 2ac1gð1 εÞ

a4 þ 2a2g2  g4

þ 4ac2a3ð1 εÞ

2a2  g2

2aεag

3a2  g2

ða εa c2aþ c1gÞ 

a2  g2
h
c22a
2

4a2  g2

 c21g2

2a2  g2

 2c1c2ga3
i
:
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respect to b, we get
vqIII*
vb
¼

c1g22c1a2þ2aaεaεgþc2agþag

8Ia24Ig2þab2

2

8Ia24Ig2ab2
2
Recall that a>g, 8Ia
24g2ab2
4a >0, 8Ia
2 4Ig2þ ab2 >0, and
c1g2 2c1a2þ 2aaε aεgþ c2agþ ag ¼ aεð2a gÞ c1ð2a2 g2Þ
þ gðaþ c2aÞ ¼ B4 >0. Thus, we have vq
III*
vb
 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. In the RS-Bertrand model, we introduce
the concept of marginal proﬁt as the decision variable to substitute
the retail price:
p1 ¼ u1 þm1; (A44)
p2 ¼ u2 þm2: (A45)
By substituting Eqs. (A44) and (A45) into Eqs. (8)-(10), we attain
that:
PM1 ¼ ðu1  c1Þ
h
εa aðu1 þm1Þ þ gðu2 þm2Þ þ bq
i
 Iq2;
(A46)
PM2 ¼ ðu2  c2Þ½ð1 εÞa aðu2 þm2Þ þ gðu1 þm1Þ; (A47)PR ¼ m1½εa aðu1 þm1Þ þ gðu2 þm2Þ þ bq þm2½ð1 εÞa
 aðu2 þm2Þ þ gðu1 þm1Þ:
(A48)
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (A46) with respect to u1
and q, and the ﬁrst order derivative of (A47) with respect to u1 and
setting them equal to 0, we can obtain that:
vPM1
vu1
¼ 2au1 þ gu2 þ bq am1 þ gm2 þ aεþ ac1 ¼ 0;
(A49)
vPM2
vu2
¼ 2au2 þ gu1  am2 þ gm1 þ a aεþ ac2 ¼ 0;
(A50)
vPM1
vq
¼ bðu1  c1Þ  2Iq ¼ 0: (A51)
Therefore, the Hessian matrix of PM1 is as follows:
Hðu1; qÞ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PM1
vu21
v2PM1
vu1q
v2PM1
vqu1
v2PM1
vq2
1
CCCCA ¼

2a2 b
b 2I
	
: (A52)
The Hessianmatrix ofPM1 is a negative deﬁnite for all u1 and q if
I, a and b satisfy the conditions that 4Ia2 b2 >0.
Then we get the second-order derivatives of PM2 :
v2PM2
vu22
¼ 2a: (A53)
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vPM2
vu2
¼ 0 has the unique
solution.
Solving Eqs. (A49)-(A51), we obtain thatu1 ¼


m2ag

2a2  g2m1 þ εað2a gÞ þ agþ aðc2gþ 2c1aÞI  c1ab2
4Ia2  Ig2  ab2
; (A54)u2¼
1
2ð4Ia2Ig2ab2
n2hm1agð2a2g2Þm2þ2aað1εÞþεag
þaðc1gþ2c2aÞ
i
I
h
að1εÞþc2aþc1gam2þgm1Þb2
o
;
(A55)
q ¼
b
h
εað2a gÞ  ðc1 þm1Þ

2a2  l2

þ ðc2 þm2Þagþ ag
i
2

4Ia2  Ig2  ab2
 :
(A56)
Substituting Eqs. (A54)-(A56) into Eq. (A48), we attain that:
PR¼
1
2

4Ia2 Ig2ab2
n2aIhεað2agÞðm1m2Þ

2a2g2



c1m1þc2m2þm21þm22

þagðc1m2þc2m1Þþ2agm1m2
þ2aam2þagm1
i
þab2
h
ðεaaþc1gc2aÞm2þam22
gm1m2
io
:
(A57)
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (A57) with respect to m1
and m2, and setting them equal to 0, we can obtain that:
vPR
vm1
¼ 1
2

4Ia2  Ig2  ab2
n 2aIhð2m1 þ c1Þ

2a2  g2

 εað2a gÞ  gðaþ ac2 þ 2am2Þ
i
m2agb2
o
¼ 0;
(A58)
vPR
vm2
¼ 1
2

4Ia2  Ig2  ab2
n 2aIhð2m2 þ c2Þ

2a2  g2

 2aað1 εÞ  gðεaþ c1aþ 2m1aÞ
i
 ðaε aþ c2a
þ 2m2a c1gm1gÞ
o
ab2
¼ 0:
(A59)
The Hessian matrix of PR we can get as follows:Hðm1;m2Þ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PR
vm21
v2PR
vm1m2
v2PR
vm2m1
v2PR
vm22
1
CCCCA
¼
0
BBBBBBBB@
2aI2a2  g2
4Ia2  Ig2  ab2
ag

4Ia b2

2

4Ia2  Ig2  ab2

ag

4Ia b2

2

4Ia2  Ig2  ab2
 a

4Ia2  2Ig2  ab2

4Ia2  Ig2  ab2
1
CCCCCCCCA
:
(A60)
Eq. (A60) shows that the Hessian matrix of PR is a negative
deﬁnite for all values of m1 and m2 if
a2 ½16I2ða2g2Þð4a2g2Þ16ab2ða2g2Þg2b4
4ð4Ia2Ig2ab2Þ2 >0.
Combining Eqs. (A58) and (A59), we can derive that:
mIV*1 ¼
8C3I2 þ C4I þ A7gb4
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (A61)
mIV*2 ¼
2I

4C5I  C6b2

16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
: (A62)
Then substituting Eqs. (A61) and (A62) into Eqs. (A54)-(A56), we
obtain that:
uIV*1 ¼
8C7I2 þ 2C8b2I  c1g2b4
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (A63)
uIV*2 ¼
8C9I2 þ 2C10b2I  c2g2b4
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (A64)
qIV* ¼

4C11I þ C12gb2

b
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
: (A65)
By substituting Eqs. (A63)-(A65) into Eqs. (A44) and (A45), we
obtain that:
pIV*1 ¼
8C13I2 þ 2C14b2I þ C15
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
; (A66)
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8C16I2 þ 2C17b2I  c2g2b4
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
: (A67)
After substituting Eqs. (A63)-(A67) into Eqs. (8)-(10), we get
that:
PIV*M1 ¼
I

4C11I þ C12gb2
2
4aI  b2

h
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
i2 ; (A68)
PIV*M2 ¼
4aI2

4C18I þ C19b2
2
h
16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
i2 ; (A69)
PIV*R ¼
2aI

2C20I þ C21b2

16

C1I2 þ C2b2I

 g2b4
: (A70)
So the total proﬁt of the supply chain is as follows:
PIV*SC ¼ PIV*M1 þP
IV*
M2 þP
IV*
R : (A71)
whereC1 ¼

a2  g2

4a2  g2

;C2 ¼ a

a2  g2

;C3 ¼

4a2  g2
h
aðε
C4 ¼ 2
h
c1a

4a2  5g2

þ c2g

2a2  g2

 εa

4a2 þ g2

 6aagð1
C5 ¼

4a2  g2
h
aað1 εÞ þ εag c2

a2  g2
i
;
C6 ¼ að1 εÞ

4a2  g2

þ
h
c1g

2a2  g2

þ 2aεag
i
 c2a

4a2  3
C7 ¼

a2  g2
h
agð1 εÞ þ c1

6a2  g2

þ c2agþ 2aεa
i
;
C8 ¼ ag½εgþ að1 εÞ 

a2  g2

ðc2gþ 8c1aÞ;
C9 ¼

a2  g2
h
2aað1 εÞ þ c2

6a2  g2

þ c1agþ εag
i
;
C10 ¼ aεag að1 εÞ

2a2  g2



a2  g2

ðc1gþ 6c2aÞ;
C11 ¼

a2  g2
h
c2ag c1

2a2  g2

þ 2aεaþ agð1 εÞ
i
;C12 ¼ aa
C13 ¼ agð1 εÞ

5a2  2g2

þ að2c1aþ c2gÞ

a2  g2

þ 3aεa

2a2
C14 ¼ 4aεa2  5aagð1 εÞ þ a

c2ag 4c1a2 þ 3c1g2

;C15 ¼ ða
C16 ¼ aεg

5a2  2g2

þ að2ac2 þ gc1Þ

a2  g2

þ 3aað1 εÞ

2a2
C17 ¼ a
h
2ð1 εÞ

3a2  g2

þ 3εag
i
 c2a

2a2  3g2

 c1g

3a2
C18 ¼

a2  g2
h
c2

2a2  g2

 2aað1 εÞ  c1ag εag
i
;
C19 ¼ að1 εÞ

2a2  g2

þ ðc1g 2c2aÞ

a2  g2

þ εaag;
C20 ¼

a2  g2
h
2a2  g2

c21 þ c22

 2c1c2ag
i
2a

a2  g2

½εð2a gÞðc1  c2Þ þ ðc1gþ 2c2aÞ  2a2εð1 εÞð2a
C21 ¼
h
aðc2a c1gÞ  a2ð1 εÞ
i
½að1 εÞ þ εg þ

a2  g2
h
c1c2gþProof of Proposition 8. The proof is similar to that of Proposition
2, and is thus omitted here.
Proof of Proposition 9. In the RS-Stackelberg model, similar to
the RS-Bertrand model, we solve Eq. (A50) and derive the response
function of M2 as follows:
u2 ¼
c2
2
þ gu1 þ gm1  am2 þ að1 εÞ
2a
: (A72)
Substituting Eq. (A72) into Eq. (8), we can obtain that:
PM1 ¼
1
2a
h
2a2  g2

c1u1 m1u1  u21

þ ð2εaa εag
þ c2agþm2agþ agÞu1 þ 2abqðu1  c1Þ  2aIq2
 c1εað2a gÞ þ c1m1

2a2  g2

 gðac1c2 þ ac1m2
þ ac1Þ
i
:
(A73)
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (A73) with respect u1 and
q, and setting them equal to 0, we can attain that:a εgþ gÞ  c1

a2  g2
i
;
 εÞ
i
b2;
g2

;
ð1 εÞ þ aεg c2

a2  g2

;
 g2

;
εa c2aÞgb4;
 g2

;
 2g2

;
gÞða gÞ þ a2

2a2 þ g2

;
ac2ð1 εÞ  ac22
i
:
vPM1
vu1
¼ 2εaa εagþ agþ

2a2  g2½ðc1 m1Þ  2u1 þ 2abqþ agðc2 þm2Þ
2a
¼ 0; (A74)
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vq
¼ bðu1  c1Þ  2Iq ¼ 0: (A75)
The Hessian matrix of PM1 can be given as follows:
Hðu1; qÞ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PM1
vu21
v2PM1
vu1q
v2PM1
vqu1
v2PM1
vq2
1
CCCCA ¼
0
B@
2a2 þ g2
a
b
b 2I
1
CA:
(A76)
The Hessianmatrix ofPM1 is a negative deﬁnite for all u1 and q if
I, a and b satisfy the conditions that 4Ia
22Ig2ab2
a >0.
Solving Eqs. (A75) and (A76), we obtain that:
u1¼
I


2εaaεagþagþc2agþm2agþðc1m1Þ

2a2g2c1ab2
4Ia22Ig2ab2
;
(A77)
q ¼ b


2εaa εagþ agþ c2agþm2ag ðc1 þm1Þ

2a2  g2
2

4Ia2  2Ig2  ab2
 :
(A78)
Substituting Eqs. (A77) and (A78) into Eq. (A72), we attain that:
u2 ¼
1
2a

4Ia2  2Ig2  ab2
nIh4a2  g2ða aεþ c2aÞ
þ 2εaag am2

4a2  3g2

þ ðc1 þm1Þ

2a2  g2
i
þ

εaa aaþm2a2  c2a2  c1agm1ag

b2
o
:
(A79)
After substituting Eqs. (A77)-(A79) into Eq. (10), we attain that:
PR ¼
1
2a

4Ia2  2Ig2  ab2


I

agðc1m2 þ c2m1 þ 2m1m2Þ


2a2  g2

 a2

c2m2 þm22

4a2  3g2



c1m1
þm21

2a2  g2
2 þ 2m1εaa

2a2  g2

þ ð1 εÞ

4m2aa
3 þ 2m1aga2 m2aag2 m1ag3

þ 2m2εaga2

þ ðεa aþ c2a c1gþm2a
m1gÞm2a2b2

(A80)
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (A80) with respect to m1
and m2, and setting them equal to 0, we can get that:vPR
vm1
¼ 1
2a

4Ia2  2Ig2  ab2


I

ð2εaaþ 2m2agþ c2agþ ag
 εagÞ

2a2  g2

 ðc1 þ 2m1Þ

2a2  g2
2
m2ga2b2

¼ 0;
(A81)
vPR
vm2
¼ 1
2

4Ia2  2Ig2  ab2
nIhgðc1 þ 2m1Þ

2a2  g2

 aðc2
þ 2m2Þ

4a2  3g2

þ a

4a2  g2

ð1 εÞ þ 2εaag
i

h
a2ðc2 þ 2m2Þ  aað1 εÞ  agðc1 þ 2m1Þ
i
b2
o
¼ 0:
(A82)
The Hessian matrix of PR is as follows:
Hðm1;m2Þ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PR
vm21
v2PR
vm1m2
v2PR
vm2m1
v2PR
vm22
1
CCCCA
¼
0
BBBBBBB@
I

2a2g2
2
a

4Ia22Ig2ab2
 g
2
g
2
a

4Ia23Ig2ab2

4Ia22Ig2ab2
1
CCCCCCCA
:
(A83)
Eq. (A83) shows that the Hessian matrix of PR is a negative
deﬁnite for all values of m1 and m2 if
8ða2g2Þð2a2g2Þ½2I2ð2a2g2ÞIab2a2g2b4
4ð4Ia22Ig2ab2Þ2 >0.
Combining Eqs. (A81) and (A82), we can derive that:
mV*1 ¼
8C24I2 þ C25I þ A7ga2b4
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
; (A84)
mV*2 ¼
I

8C24I  C26b2

8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
: (A85)
After substituting Eqs. (A84) and (A85) into Eqs. (A77)- (A79),
we attain that:
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4C27I2 þ 2C28ab2I  c1a2g2b4
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
; (A86)
uV*2 ¼
2C29I2 þ C30b2I  c2g2a3b4
8a

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 g2a3b4
; (A87)
qV* ¼

2C31I þ C8ga2b2

b
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
: (A88)
Substituting Eqs. (A84)- (A88) into Eqs. (A44) and (A45), we
obtain that:
pV*1 ¼
4C32I2 þ C33ab2I þ C15a2
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
; (A89)
pV*2 ¼
2C34I2 þ C35ab2I  c2g2a3b4
8a

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 g2a3b4
: (A90)C22 ¼

a2  g2

2a2  g2
2
;C23 ¼ a

a2  g2

2a2  g2

;
C24 ¼

2a2  g2
2h
agð1 εÞ  c1

a2  g2

þ εaa
i
;
C25 ¼ ab2
h
 gða εaþ c1gÞ

12a2  5g2

 2aðεa c1aÞ

4a2  g2
C26 ¼

2a2  g2
h
c1g

2a2  g2

 c2a

4a2  3g2

þ að1 εÞ

4a2
C27 ¼
h
3c1

2a2  g2

þ ðag εagþ 2εaaþ c2agÞ
i
a2  g2

2a2 
C28 ¼ aagða εaþ εgÞ 

a2  g2
h
4c1

2a2  g2

þ c2ag
i
;
C29 ¼

a2  g2

2a2  g2
h
c1g

2a2  g2

þ c2a

12a2  5g2

þ a
C30 ¼ 

a2  g2

2a2  g2

c1agþ 6c2a2

 aað1 εÞ

2a2  g2
C31 ¼

a2  g2

2a2  g2
h
agð1 εÞ þ c2ag c1

2a2  g2

þ 2aε
C32 ¼ a

2a2  g2
h
2εa

3a2  2g2

þ gð1 εÞ

5a2  3g2
i
þ

a2
C33 ¼

2a2  g2
h
 5agð1 εÞ  4εaa c1

4a2  3g2

þ c2ag
i
;
C34 ¼

a2  g2

2a2  g2
h
c1g

2a2  g2

þ c2a

4a2  g2
i
þ a

C35 ¼ 

2a2  g2
h
2að1 εÞ

3a2  g2

þ c1g

3a2  2g2

þ c2a

2
C36 ¼

a2  g2

2a2  g2
2h
c2ag c1

2a2  g2

þ agð1 εÞ þ 2a
C37 ¼

a2  g2

2a2  g2
h
c1

2a2  g2

 2c2ag
i
þ a

2a2  g2

C38 ¼

a2  g2

2a2  g2
h
c2a

4a2  3g2

 c1g

2a2  g2

 2ε
C39 ¼ ðgc1  2c2aÞ

a2  g2

2a2  g2

þ a

2a2  g2
h
ð1 εÞ

2a2After substituting Eqs. (A86)-(A90) into Eqs. (8)-(10), we get
that:
PV*M1 ¼
I

2C31I þ C12ga2b2

4C36I2 þ 2C37ab2I  C12ga3b4

a
h
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
i2 ;
(A91)
PV*M2 ¼
I2

2C38I þ C39ab2
2
a
h
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
i2 ; (A92)
PV*M2 ¼
I2

2C38I þ C39ab2
2
a
h
8

2C22I2 þ C23b2I

 a2g2b4
i2 : (A93)
Thus, the total proﬁt of the supply chain is as follows:
PV*SC ¼ PV*M1 þP
V*
M2 þP
V*
R : (A94)
where
þ c2ag

4a2  3g2
i
;
 g2

þ 2εaag
i
;
g2

;
ð1 εÞ

4a2  g2

þ 2εaag
i
;
2  εaga22a2  g2;
a
i
;
 g2

2a2  g2
h
c1

2a2  g2

þ c2ag
i
;
2a2  g2
h
2εag

5a2  3g2

þ ð1 εÞ

12a4  9a2g2 þ g4
i
;
a2  3g2

þ 3εaag
i
;
aε
i
;
h
ð1 εÞg3  εa

2a2  3g2
i
;
aag að1 εÞ

4a2  g2
i
;
 g2

þ εag
i
;
C40 ¼ a2

4a2  g2
h
ð1 2εÞ

2a4  g4

þ 4ε2a4
i
þ 4agεð1 εÞa2

2a2  g2

3a2  g2

2½2εac1aþ ac1gð1 εÞ þ agc1c2

a2  g2

2a2  g2
2  4εac2ga2

a2  g2

2a2  g2

þc21

a2  g2

2a2  g2
3 þ c2a

a2  g2

2a2  g2
h
c2a

4a2  3g2

 2að1 εÞ

4a2  g2
i
ε2a2g2

a2  g2

2a2 þ g2

 a2a2g4

4ε2 þ 2ε 1

;
C41 ¼ c2ðc1g c2aÞ

a2  g2

2a2  g2

þ εagðc2aþ c1a c1gÞ

2a2  g2

þac2ð1 εÞ

2a2  g2
2  a22a2  g2½εgð1 εÞ þ a þ aa2a2  g2½εað2 εÞ  c1g:
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Proposition 2, and is thus omitted here.
Proof of Proposition 11. Based on the game structure, we ﬁrst
solve for the objective function of the retailer.
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (48) with respect to p1
and p2 and setting them to 0 as follows:
vPR
vp1
¼ εaap1þgp2þbqðp1u1Þaþðp2u2Þg¼0; (A95)
vPR
vp2
¼ð1 εÞaap2þgp1þðp1u1Þgðp2u2Þa¼0: (A96)
The Hessian matrix of PR is
Hðp1; p2Þ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PR
vp21
v2PR
vp1p2
v2PR
vp2p1
v2PR
vp22
1
CCCCA ¼
2a 2g
2g 2a
	
: (A97)
The Hessianmatrix ofPR is a negative deﬁnite for all values of p1
and p2 if a>g. Combining Eqs. (A95) and (A96), we can obtain that:
p1 ¼
aaε agεþ u1a2  u1g2 þ abqþ ag
2

a2  g2 ; (A98)
p2 ¼
aaεþ agεþ u2a2  u2g2 þ gbqþ aa
2

a2  g2 : (A99)
Substituting Eqs. (A98) and (A99) into Eqs. (47) and (9), we have
PM1 ¼

gu1u2gc1u2aεc1þaεu1þac1u1au21bqc1þbqu1

2
 Ifq2;
(A100)
PM2 ¼
ðu2  c2Þða aεþ gu1  au2Þ
2
: (A101)
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (A100) with respect to u1
and q and the ﬁrst order derivative of Eq. (A101) with respect to u2
and setting them to 0, we can obtain that:
vPM1
vu1
¼ au1 þ
gu2
2
þ bq
2
þ aε ac1
2
¼ 0; (A102)vPM2
vu2
¼ gu1
2
 au2 þ
a aεþ ac2
2
¼ 0; (A103)
vPM1
vq
¼ ðu1  c1Þb
2
 2Ifq ¼ 0: (A104)
Now, the Hessian matrix is as follows:
Hðu1; qÞ ¼
0
BBBB@
v2PM1
vu21
v2PM1
vu1q
v2PM1
vqu1
v2PM1
vq2
1
CCCCA ¼
0
BB@
a b
2
b
2
2If
1
CCA: (A105)
The Hessian matrix of PM1 is a negative deﬁnite for all values of
u1 and q if I, f, a and b satisfy the conditions that 2Ifa b
2
4 >0.
Solving Eqs. (A102)-(A104), we ﬁnd that:
uVI*1 ¼
2fIB2  c1ab2
fIB1  ab2
; (A106)
uVI*2 ¼
4fIB3  A4b2
2

fIB1  ab2
 ; (A107)
qVI* ¼ B4b
2

fIB1  ab2
 : (A108)
Substituting Eqs. (A106)-(A108) into Eqs. (A98) and (A99), we
can derive that:
pVI*1 ¼
4fIB5  B6b2
4A1

fIB1  ab2
 ; (A109)
pVI*2 ¼
4fIB7  B8b2
4A1

fIB1  ab2
 : (A110)
Then substituting Eqs. (A106)-(A110) into Eqs. (9), (47) and (48),
we can derive that:
PVI*M1 ¼
fI

8fIa b2

B24
4

fIB1  ab2
2 ; (A111)
PVI*M2 ¼
a

4fIB9  A7b2
2
8

fIB1  ab2
2 ; (A112)
PVI*R ¼
4fIa2B4

4fIB10  A7gb2

 4ð1 fÞIA1B24b2 þ a2

4fIB9  A7b2

4fIB11  A7ab2

16A1

fIB1  ab2
2 : (A113)
P. Ma et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 183 (2018) 618e640 639Therefore, the total proﬁt of the supply chain is as follows:PVI*SC ¼PVI*M1 þP
VI*
M2 þP
VI*
R
¼
4fI

8fIab2

A1B24þ2a

4fIB9A7b2
2
A14ð1fÞIA1B24b2þ4a2fI

4fIB10A7gb2

B4þa2

4fIB9A7b2

4fIB11A7ab2

16A1

fIB1ab2
2 :
(A114)Proof of Proposition 12. Taking the ﬁrst derivative of Eq. (51)
with respect to b, we get
vqVI*
vb
¼

c1g22c1a2þ2aaεaεgþc2agþag

8fIa22fIg2þab2

2

8fIa22fIg2ab2
2
Recall that a>g, 2Ifa b24>0, 8fIa2 2fIg2þ ab2>0, and c1g2
2c1a2þ 2aaε aεgþ c2agþ ag¼ aεð2a gÞ c1ð2a2 g2Þþ gðaþ
c2aÞ¼ B4>0. Then, we have vq
VI*
vb
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